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Abstract
Economic growth in Sub-Saharan Africa has been characterized by deindustrialization.
Conventional economists argue that this is due to a bad environment for business decision
making. This paper provides a classical explanation for deindustrialization, the failure to
solve the food problem. That is, food staple prices have risen rapidly resulting in labor
becoming costly, although physically abundant. This has prevented the evolution of a
comparative advantage in labor intensive manufacturing. Structural change is an important
element of the process of economic development, especially in the early stages.
Productivity grows by shifting labor out of agriculture where productivity is low, and into
industry or manufacturing where labor productivity is high. However, there is not just a
comparative static productivity gain from structural change. It also seems that there is a
dynamic gain as well. Unconditional convergence in labor productivity does tend to occur
in manufacturing. That is, once a manufacturing sector is established in a less developed
region, labor productivity in that sector tends to converge to that found in that same sector
in developed countries. Thus, aggregate (economy wide) convergence generally fails to
occur in many low income countries because manufacturing remains much too small a
share in the overall economy. There is a dynamic gain in labor productivity that results
from successful structural change. Indeed the process described above seems to be a very
good description of the development process in East and Southeast Asia. These countries
managed to shift labor into labor intensive manufacturing and industry, a large part of
which was produced for export. This led to dramatic increases in the rate of growth of per
capita income as well as a dramatic reduction in overall levels of poverty.
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Recently, economic growth in Sub-Saharan Africa has risen dramatically. Beginning in the
1990s a number of economic reforms occurred and there was rapid growth in the demand for raw
materials and resources resulting from rapid Chinese growth. These factors resulted in a significant
rise in growth rates of GDP per capita throughout much of Sub-Saharan Africa. However, the
puzzling thing about this economic growth is that it has been accompanied by a lack of growth in
manufacturing and perhaps even a deindustrialization of the economy, with the share of
manufacturing and industry in GDP declining over time (reword SD). Compared to the East and
Southeast Asian experience this is a significant anomaly. It would seem to indicate that the recent
growth in the region is fragile in nature and not likely to persist. How does one explain this
anomaly? This is a very important question since China’s rapid economic development is opening
up significant opportunities.
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Specifically, unit labor costs are beginning to rise in China implying that China is shifting
out of the production of low end (labor intensive) manufactured and industrial goods and is moving
up the technological ladder by producing technologically more sophisticated (capital intensive,
physical as well as human capital) products. Thus opportunities exist for Sub-Saharan Africa to
shift into labor intensive, export oriented manufacturing and industry. However, the slow
development of industry and the deindustrialization process (reword SD) the region is undergoing
would seem to indicate that this opportunity is being or will be lost. Why is this process,
deindustrialization, occurring ? Conventional analysis has usually argued that this failure is the
result of governance issues, lack of investment in infrastructure and education, and a lack of
openness to trade and foreign investment. However, a number of countries in East and Southeast
Asia have managed to achieve rapid growth under similar circumstances. It will be argued, that
classical economics is more useful in trying to explain why Africa has de-industrialized and the
relevance of the classical model is related to a lack of institutional evolution.
Deindustrialization
What is deindustrialization ? Williamson and Clingingsmith (2005) have developed the
following explanation of the term : they assumed an economy in which two goods are produced
(agriculture and manufacturing) utilizing three inputs: labor, land, and capital. Labor is used to
produce both goods while capital is specific to manufacturing and land to agriculture. In this
context, absolute deindustrialization occurs when labor moves out of the manufacturing sector and
into the agricultural sector. Thus the absolute number of workers in manufacturing declines while
that in agriculture rises. In a many sector model absolute deindustrialization would generally
involve a fall in the number of workers in manufacturing. Relative deindustrialization occurs when
the share of total employment in manufacturing declines, while the share of agriculture expands.
In the context of a many sector model, relative deindustrialization involves a fall in the share of
manufacturing in total employment.
One can make a similar sort of analysis by focusing on the share of manufacturing in total
GDP. Thus absolute deindustrialization would be represented by a decline in real total
manufacturing. Alternatively, relative deindustrialization occurs when the share of manufacturing
in total GDP declines over time. Deindustrialization in terms of employment and production are
likely to be related. Those countries for which manufacturing output as a share of GDP is declining
are likely to be those countries for which manufacturing employment as a share of overall
employment is also likely to decline.
One could interpret the concept of deindustrialization in a broader sense. In this
interpretation manufacturing as a share of GDP or employment may not fall, instead it may remain
stable or even increase, but to a much lesser degree than another sector, in particular services. This
generally occurs while an economy attains a fairly high level of GDP per capita. However, this
can be quite problematic if it begins to occur at much lower levels of income. Why problematic?
Such a premature shift into services may limit future productivity growth. One can think of this as
deindustrialization in the sense that the more common pattern experienced by developing nations
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is that initially structural change involves a shift of production and employment into manufacturing
and industry and only later into services. Thus, the process by which the manufacturing stage is
skipped can also be thought of deindustrialization.
As growth has occurred over time in Sub-Saharan Africa, so has deindustrialization. Data
concerning this issue is difficult to find. deVries, Timmer, and deVries (2013) have developed a
useful data set for examining these issues. This data set covers eleven Sub-Saharan African nations
for the period 1960 to 2010. It includes data on gross value added at nominal, real, and international
prices as well as information on employment by sector of the economy. This data allows an
examination of the issues discussed above, especially those pertaining to structural change.
In Table One, data is presented on value added, employment, and relative labor
productivity by sector of the economy. The data for value added and employment represents each
sector’s proportion of the economy’s total value added and employment. With respect to relative
productivity levels, this represents the ratio of the sector’s labor productivity level to the total
economy’s productivity level. A 0.5 for agriculture implies that this sectors labor productivity was
half of that for the whole economy. Examining the data one can see that agriculture has certainly
followed the typical pattern in terms of structural change. Agriculture’s share in value added and
employment has significantly declined over time. However, labor productivity in agriculture has
lagged behind that of the rest of the economy.
Table 1
Value added, employment, and relative labor productivity by sector
Sectoral Shares
Sector

Value Added

Relative
Productivity Levels

Employment

1960

1975

1990

2010

1960

1975

1990

2010

1960

1975

1990

2010

Agriculture

37.6

29.2

24.9

22.4

72.7

66.0

61.6

49.8

0.5

0.4

0.4

0.4

Industry

24.3

30.0

32.6

27.8

9.3

13.1

14.3

13.4

4.4

3.7

3.5

2.6

Mining

8.1

6.2

11.2

8.9

1.7

1.5

1.5

0.9

15.7

22.4

23.3

19.5

Manufacturing

9.2

14.7

14.0

10.1

4.7

7.8

8.9

8.3

2.5

2.8

2.4

1.6

Other Industry

7.1

9.2

7.3

8.9

3.0

3.8

3.9

4.2

8.5

5.8

5.3

2.9

Services

38.1

40.7

42.6

49.8

18.0

20.9

24.1

36.8

2.7

2.5

2.4

1.6

Total
Economy

100

100

100

100

100

100

100

100

1.0

1.0

1.0

1.0
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When focusing on the industrial sector several anomalies appear (word choice SD).
Looking at the industrial sector as a whole, the share of value added seems to have risen between
1960 and 1990. However, after that there is a decline. Examining the subcategories under industry
one can see that manufacturing actually begins to decline after 1975. In terms of employment,
employment shares in both industry and manufacturing rise until 1990 and then decline.
Examining relative productivity a similar story emerges. Overall productivity in industry is
significantly greater than that found in the overall economy, but this overall advantage begins to
decline as after 1975. Manufacturing follows a similar pattern.
Finally, the sector which has expanded most rapidly has been the service sector. It has
grown both in terms of value added and employment shares. Looking at relative labor productivity,
one can see that this sector is more productive than the economy as a whole, but not to the extent
of industry. Also relative productivity has fallen over time. Lastly, relative labor productivity in
services was certainly higher than that of agriculture throughout the time period.
So what conclusions can be drawn from this data? First, relative deindustrialization seems
to have occurred both in terms of employment and value added. Second, deindustrialization has
also seemed to occur in the sense that structural change seems to have skipped over industry with
the service sector taking up the unused capacity in terms of both production and employment. The
picture of structural change in Sub-Saharan Africa can be described in the following manner.
Agriculture has shrunk in terms of both production and employment. Much of this production and
employment has shifted into the service sector, not the industrial sector (nor manufacturing). The
shift in labor has been from a low productive sector, agriculture, to a higher productive sector,
services. However, the gain in productivity seems to have been much less than that which would
have occurred from a shift to industry. Even more importantly, productivity growth in services is
much lower than that in industry. We can describe this type of structural change as generating
static gains at the expense of dynamic losses (deVries, et al., 2013).
Table 2
Sectoral Composition Real GDP
Year
Primary
Industry
Services
1888
41.5
8.1
46.3
1900
34.6
11.3
47.5
1910
31.5
5.4
42.8
1920
24.7
19.0
43.2
1930
20.7
24.0
35.6
1938
15.9
32.4
32.3
Note. Adapted from: Teranishi (2005).

Construction
2.6
3.5
4.0
3.4
4.9
6.9

Infrastructure
1.5
3.1
6.3
9.7
14.6
12.3

This pattern is much different than that found in the successful cases in Asia, particularly
in East Asia. Japan represents the first non-Western nation to converge to developed country
standards of living. This process began before World War II and accelerated thereafter. The focus
54

http://scholarworks.wmich.edu/ijad/

here will be on the prewar period and data on the sectoral composition of GDP in the prewar period
is presented in Table Two. As one can see, the share of primary production declines throughout
the period while that for industry rises. Employment trends followed trends in sectoral GDP as
well. Structural change involved a shift from agriculture to industry.
South Korea too has managed to converge towards developed countries’ living standards
with rapid growth beginning in the 1960s. Table Three provides some information concerning the
structural change process. As one can see, agriculture declined both as a share of GDP and
employment from 1962 to 1980, while the share of industry in these two categories rose
dramatically in tandem with the service sector. Thus economic development was accompanied by
a shift of labor out of agriculture and into industry and manufacturing.
Table 3
Structural Change - South Korea
1962

1970

1980

Agriculture
% of GDP
39.8 29.7 17.8
% of Employment
63.1 50.4 34.0
Industry
% of GDP
14.6 19.7 25.3
% of Employment
8.7 14.3 22.6
Services
% of GDP
45.6 50.6 56.8
% of Employment
28.2 35.2 43.4
__________________________________
Note. Adapted From: Looney (2012)

Finally, Taiwan has been able to converge to a standard of living similar to that found in
developed countries. Rapid growth began in the 1960s and it was also accompanied by dramatic
structural change with agriculture declining in importance both in terms of GDP and employment.
This was accompanied by growth in both industry and services as shares of GDP and employment.
These results are reflected in Tables Four and Five.
The contrast between the structural changes experienced by East Asia and Sub-Saharan
Africa are quite stark. In East Asia, the shift out of agriculture was accompanied by the expansion
of industry and in most instances services too. Alternatively, Sub-Saharan Africa has experienced
relative deindustrialization in terms of both GDP and employment. The rapid expansion of
manufacturing has failed to occur. It appears that industrialization has been skipped.
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Table 4
Structural Change in GDP -Taiwan
Year

Agriculture

Industry

Services

Total

1952

36.0

18.0

46.0

100

1956

31.9

22.4

46.0

100

1960

32.9

24.9

42.2

100

1964

28.3

28.9

42.8

100

1968

22.1

32.6

45.4

100

1972

14.2

40.3

45.5

100

1980

9.2

44.7

46.1

100

1988

6.1

46.2

47.7

100

Note. Adapted From: Mao and Schive (1995)

Table 5
Structural Change in Employment -Taiwan
Year

Agriculture

Industry

Services

Total

1952

56.1

16.9

27.0

100

1956

53.2

18.3

28.5

100

1960

50.2

20.5

29.3

100

1964

49.5

21.3

29.2

100

1968

40.8

25.4

33.8

100

1972

33.0

31.8

35.2

100

1980

19.5

42.4

38.1

100

1988

13.7

42.6

43.7

100

Note. Adapted From: Mao and Schive (1995)
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Why has Sub-Saharan Africa Failed to Develop a Comparative
Advantage in Industry (manufacturing)?
Explanations: Conventional and Classical
Conventional Perspective
Conventional perspectives on Sub-Saharan Africa’s failure to evolve a productive
industrial sector tend to focus on issues of policy and governance. With respect to policy, it is often
noted that after World War II and the successful move to independence, many of the new
governments pursued a state centered process of economic development that has come to be known
as import substitution industrialization (ISI). This approach to industrialization sought to protect
or subsidize industrial production. Many of these countries had comparative advantages in a
variety of primary types of goods, often based on minerals and other sorts of natural resources.
The ISI strategy involved policies that shifted resources out of sectors in which these countries
were relatively efficient and into sectors in which production was inefficient.
The policies utilized were quite varied. Tariffs and quotas were used to provide protection
to domestic manufacturing firms. Foreign exchange controls were imposed so as to allow the state
to control foreign exchange and direct it to sectors which were being promoted. In some instances,
state ownership and control of specific sectors was undertaken to allow the state to directly manage
resource allocation. Agriculture was often neglected in terms of investment since productivity
there tended to be quite low. In addition, the state often created parastatal institutions for the
marketing of important agricultural goods. This allowed the state to use monopsony power to push
down the relative prices of these agricultural goods. This effectively transferred resources to the
non-agricultural sector (Anderson and Masters, 2009).
The results of ISI have been viewed negatively. As was discussed in Table One, the share
of industry in GDP and employment did rise, but not dramatically. The protected sectors of the
economy remained largely inefficient. From a dynamic perspective this strategy seemed to fail.
International indebtedness rose dramatically among the nations of the region eventually resulting
in an economic collapse. Beginning in the 1990s many countries in the region underwent structural
adjustment programs under the direction of various international institutions. In this process tariffs
and quotas were reduced, exchange rates reformed and devalued, state ownership was reduced in
extent, and marketing boards dismantled. The extent of protection of industry and manufacturing
was dramatically reduced and the extent of discrimination against the agricultural sector was
reduced. This has, according to some, laid the foundation for the rapid economic growth
experienced by the region over the last fifteen years. Policy changes are seen to be the key in
integrating Africa with the international economy and promoting rapid growth (Sachs and Warner,
1997).
The failure of manufacturing/industry to rapidly grow even during the recent period of
rapid overall growth is often attributed to problems of governance or the bad business environment
that results from flawed governance. Problems involving governance are often manifested in
widespread corruption in government institutions. This results in misallocated investment, waste,
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and slower growth. Resources are utilized to the benefit of small groups of powerful political elites.
Authoritarian political structures dominate and there are few checks on the use of power.
Bad business environments are also the result of the lack of infrastructure in many Sub-Saharan
countries. The lack of infrastructure, including power generation and distribution, limits the spread
of modern manufacturing firms. In addition, the red tape and bureaucracy limits entrepreneurial
decision-making and inhibits investment in modern manufacturing firms. This results in
productivity enclaves, “islands of high productivity in a sea of smaller low productivity firms.”
(Gelb, et al., 2014).
The solution to the problems of corruption and the existence of a bad business environment
are thought by many to involve political reform. This reform would involve the expansion of
pluralism via the construction of democratic institutions and practices. In fact, better recent policies
and economic performance have been at least partly linked to significant political reform (Ndulu
and O’Connell, 1999).
The conventional or neoclassical perspective is undermined by the fact that most of the
economically successful countries of East and Southeast Asia were faced with similar initial
conditions. Governance issues and corruption in these countries, result in environments that limit
the development of manufacturing. Democracy and pluralism did not precede rapid growth and
the development of labor intensive manufacturing. In most cases, it was the exact opposite. South
Korea and Taiwan industrialized under authoritarian regimes as has China. Japan began its
industrialization process (prior to World War II) under a political regime which was authoritarian
in nature, even though there were some aspects of democratic institutions in existence.
Classical Perspective
A relatively modern version of classical analysis in development economics is represented
by the work of Lewis (1954). He developed a model composed of two sectors: traditional and
modern. The traditional sector was mainly distinguished by how production units make decisions.
He argued that output in this sector was shared in a manner such that each worker receives their
average product. Only labor and land are used in the production process and no capital is utilized
or accumulated (saving and investment are zero). Finally, no technological innovation occurs in
the staple food production.
The modern sector will be assumed to represent manufacturing. Profits are maximized with
wage being equal to the marginal product of labor. Capital and labor are utilized in the production
process with the former being accumulated via savings and investment. In the Model, technical
change does not occur. Within this scheme, economic growth can only arise via structural change.
The marginal product of labor in the traditional sector is assumed to be zero (surplus labor), while
manufacturing is positive. As capital is accumulated in the modern sector, labor shifts from the
sector where productivity is low to the sector where it is high (manufacturing) and growth occurs
with labor productivity rising (per capita income).
Difficulties arise when surplus labor is exhausted. When this occurs continued expansion
of manufacturing implies that food production declines and the relative price of food rises. Wages
in the manufacturing sector must rise in order to cover the increased cost of food. This will tend to
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reduce profits and slow or perhaps halt structural change (and thus growth) altogether. In addition,
the production technology in the modern sector is likely to become more capital intensive, further
slowing structural change.
There are several drawbacks to this analysis. First, as outlined above, the economy is closed
to the outside world. Results are likely to alter if one allows trade. Second, the concept of surplus
labor is controversial to say the least. Third, the growth process is structural in nature with no
allowance for technical change. Within this limited context though, a simple implication does
emerge. Labor may be physically abundant, but not economically cheap due to the rising cost of
food. In this situation, manufacturing may very well fail to develop because food becomes
increasingly expensive and what manufacturing that does develop is likely to be more capital
intensive and less labor intensive in nature.
One can easily eliminate the surplus labor assumption and assume labor is paid its marginal
product. Eswaran and Kotwal (2004) have constructed a dualistic model in which the expenditure
patterns of households are dependent on income. Specifically, at low income levels all income is
spent on food, however once income attains a specific threshold, an increasing share is spent on
manufacturing. As savings and capital accumulation occur in the modern sector, income rises and
households begin pending an increasing proportion of their income on manufactured goods.
However, whether this structural change process continues still depends on what happens to
productivity in the food sector. If productivity remains unchanged, then output in food production
will decline as labor moves into manufacturing. The rising price of food is likely then to stop the
expansion of the modern sector since the real wage in manufacturing will have to dramatically
rise. Rapid growth in agricultural productivity will keep food prices down and allow structural
transformation.
Given the dynamic characteristics of manufacturing, structural change from agriculture to
manufacturing is crucial to development. Rodrik (2013) has shown that unconditional productivity
convergence does tend to occur in manufacturing. That is, although the labor productivity of newly
established manufacturing firms is likely to be low by the international standards of developed
countries, the productivity of the sector quickly tends to converge to international standards of
productivity. The shift from agriculture to manufacturing in the development process creates static
gains. Labor moves from low to high productivity activities. But, dynamic gains in labor
productivity in manufacturing tend to grow rapidly. The key to this process involves raising
productivity in staple foods so as to allow structural change to occur.
Up to this point, the dualistic model under discussion is closed in nature. However, the
implications of low productivity in staple food production persist within the context of a semiopen economy. This idea was originally developed by Myint (1975). A semi-open economy is one
in which part of the domestic economy remains insulated from foreign trade while part of the
economy is fully open to trade. In this case, the food producing sector is presumed to be closed to
trade while manufacturing is open. It is, at this point, useful to presume that agriculture can be
divided into two sectors, a closed sector producing food and a commercial agricultural sector that
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produces an export product utilizing labor and land (a comparative advantage in this product
exists).
In this context economic growth can occur in a variety of ways. For example, an exogenous
increase in this demand for the commercial agricultural product (in terms of trade improvement)
would cause resources (labor) to shift out of staple food production and into export production.
However, it will also draw resources from the tradable modern manufacturing sector with imports
of manufacturing goods rising. However, if food productivity does not increase rapidly enough,
the comparative advantage of the commercial, export oriented agricultural sector will decline and
the comparative disadvantage of manufacturing will increase as wage increases occur as a result
of the rise in staple food prices. Structural change (into manufacturing) will be stymied,
deindustrialization will occur.
An alternative process of economic growth could occur if government policy is used to
subsidize the expansion of manufacturing (initially this sector is characterized by comparative
disadvantage). The resulting expansion of this sector will draw labor from both staple food
production and export production, but if agricultural productivity stagnates, then rising wages will
reduce the comparative advantage in the commercial export crop and eventually prevent the
structural transformation of the economy via a shift into manufacturing. Structural change is found
to be crucially dependent on growth in food productivity.
Does it make sense to think that the staple food producing sectors in Sub-Saharan Africa are closed
to trade? Gollin, et al. (2007) has argued that for many Sub-Saharan nations the staple food sector
is to all intents and purposes a closed sector. Data from the FAO indicates that most poor countries
meet their demand for food from domestic production. Thus Gollin, et al. (2007) concludes that
“it is reasonable to view most economies as closed from the perspective of trade in food”. This
conclusion seems to be even more relevant for the case of Sub-Saharan Africa. Many of the food
staples for these countries are not extensively traded. Delgado, et al. (2004) argues that the cost of
transporting and marketing staple foods isolates this type of production from international markets.
Even when staple foods are traded, the markets for these goods are often quite thin. That
is, of total production of a particular staple worldwide, the percent that is actually traded is quite
small. As a result, changes in purchases on the international market by relatively small food
importers can still have dramatic effects on the price of such staples. Thus the price of staple foods
cannot be assumed to be an exogenous variable. Instead, it must be stipulated to be endogenously
determined in any model purporting to explain structural change.
A number of hypotheses can be put forward based upon analysis within the content of the
semi-open economy developed in this section. The deindustrialization of Sub-Saharan Africa
should be associated with slow growth in food staple production. Rapid growth over the last decade
or so should have resulted in rapid increases in staple food prices. Finally, although Africa is
characterized as being incresingly labor abundant, one should expect to find that labor is not
relatively cheap in this region.
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Empirical Evidence
Whether successful transformation occurs as growth takes place depends on whether
productivity in food production rises and keeps pace with the growth of the modern manufacturing
sector. Data on food production per capita for Sub-Saharan Africa is presented in Table Six
indicating that food production per capita has generally stagnated. By the year 2009, agricultural
output had not risen by much compared to what it was in the early 1960s. Sub-Saharan Africa has
not experienced a “Green Revolution” as has much of East and Southeast Asia. This is likely due
to several factors. First, much of East and Southeast Asia relied upon rice as the main wage good.
Technical innovation that creates higher yielding seed varieties has the potential to have an impact
over a broad graphical area. It is true that seeds must be tailored to particular soil and climatic
conditions.
Table 6
Net food production per capita (Index)
Year
1961
1962
1963
1964
1965
1966
1967
1968
1969
1970
1971
1972
1973
1974
1975
1976
1977
1978
1979
1980
1981
1982
1983
1984
1985

Per Capita
100
103
104
103
102
99
104
103
104
105
106
102
98
103
101
99
95
95
93
93
93
91
88
86
90

Year
1986
1987
1988
1989
1990
1991
1992
1993
1994
1995
1996
1997
1998
1999
2000
2001
2002
2003
2004
2005
2006
2007
2008
2009

Per Capita
91
89
92
93
93
98
94
95
95
93
100
97
99
100
103
104
105
107
104
105
107
104
107
107

However, research into high yielding rice varieties has the potential to generate very high
rates of return. In Sub-Saharan Africa, the situation is quite different. No single food crop serves
as the wage good. Instead, a variety of different crops serve this function depending on which
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region in Sub-Saharan Africa one focuses on. The net direct return to investment in research in
any particular staple food crop research in Sub-Saharan Africa is likely to be much lower than that
for rice. This in itself will tend to reduce the incentive for private research firms to undertake
investment. Also, public authorities are likely to be reluctant to make investments in areas where
the direct return is so low.
Given the wages good function of these staple foods, the benefits to society of investment
in such research are likely to be immense. Without productivity growth in staple food production,
the growth of labor intensive manufacturing is likely to be quite limited. This represents a situation
in which the investment in such research is likely to be significantly below what is optimal from
society’s point of view and this implies a significant role for the state in terms of providing
resources for such agricultural research (Hayami and Ruttan, 1985). The problem of actually
creating an institutional structure to carry out such research will likely be more complex than that
faced in parts of Asia.
Table 7
Consumer prices, food indices (2000 = 100)
Region
World
Africa
Eastern Africa
Middle Africa
Western Africa
Southern Africa
Northern Africa
Americas
Northern America
Central America
Caribbean
South America
Asia
Eastern Asia
Southern Asia
Southeastern Asia
Western Asia
Europe
Eastern Europe
Northern Europe
Southern Europe
Western Europe
Note. Source: FAO

Food Price Index
232.5
354.4
445.4
711.2
356.3
245.7
257.5
211.7
141.3
209.8
364.8
293.9
229.2
188.2
255.7
259.4
421.6
189.7
293.8
148.2
149.7
128.0

It has been assumed in this paper that food staples are not widely traded and the price of
food in the dualistic model is endogenously determined. If staple food was widely traded, then
wewould see similar movement in prices in the various regions of the world. Data on food prices
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for various regions of the world is presented in Table Seven. Consumer food price indices are
presented for various regions of the world utilizing 2000 as the base year. Data is presented for the
year 2013 for each region. As can be seen, from 2000 to 2013 food prices around the world have
increased, but the patterns vary dramatically from region to region. First, world food prices have
risen to 232.5, more than doubling. But the variation by region is large.
The lowest increase was registered by Western Europe where prices increased very little.
Alternatively, for Middle Africa, food prices increased by seven times from 2000-2014. Further
examination of the table reveals that increases in food prices were highest for Middle Africa,
Eastern Africa, Western Asia, the Caribbean, and Western Africa. Food prices followed
dramatically different trends in various regions of the world lending support to the notion that
limited trade in food implies food price endogeneity. Second, large parts of Sub-Saharan Africa
experienced very rapid increases in food prices.
Such rapid increases in the cost of food in large parts of Africa, in comparison with other
regions of the world would, in the dualistic theoretical framework discussed above lead to labor
being relatively costly (although it may be physically abundant). Some light can be shed on this
issue by looking at unit labor costs which measures the ratio of wages to value added in
manufacturing. Using data from the World Bank Enterprise surveys Ramachandran, et al. (2009)
calculate unit labor costs for much of Sub-Saharan Africa and compare it to that for China and
India. What they find is that except for Mali, all other countries in Sub-Saharan Africa have unit
labor cost ratios which are higher than that for India and China.
The comparison with China is particularly enlightening. China has dominated the
production and export of labor intensive manufactured goods. Their ability to dominate the world
market for such products is based on their “cheap labor”, which in this case means low unit labor
costs. The inability of Sub-Saharan Africa to compete on a unit labor cost basis indicates that the
latter will have trouble making inroads in terms of producing and exporting labor intensive
manufactured goods. It is possible that wages in China are being driven up as a result of rapid
economic growth and that unit labor costs in China will rise above those in Sub-Saharan Africa.
However, it would seem that the country most likely to benefit from this would more likely be
India, rather than Sub-Saharan Africa.
If labor is relatively more expensive in Sub-Saharan Africa, then one should find that
manufacturing firms are more capital intensive there then they should be as firms seek to shift their
resource combinations. Gelb, et al. (2013), using data drawn from the World Bank Enterprise
Surveys are able to calculate capital per worker ratios for formal sector firms in Africa and compare
them with those in firms in other regions of the world. The results are presented in Table Eight.
The interesting thing to note is that in comparison with East and South Asia, many countries in
Sub-Saharan Africa have substantially higher capital to labor ratios. Thus these firms are not likely
to generate significant increases in employment as growth occurs.
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Table 8
Firm level capital to worker ratio (2005 $)
Region
Capital/Worker (Survey Medians)
Sub-Saharan Africa
Angola
2118
Ethiopia
999
Ghana
474
Kenya
9211
Mali
864
Mozambique
1906
Nigeria
627
Senegal
1621
South Africa
8804
Tanzania
3410
Uganda
2162
Zambia
4007
East Asia
Indonesia
665
Philippines
3196
Vietnam
2824
Europe/Central Asia
Russia
6130
Turkey
22090
Ukraine
4140
Latin America/Caribbean
Argentina
8867
Brazil
6579
Chile
7146
Columbia
4417
Mexico
4437
Uruguay
5836
South Asia
Bangladesh
624
India
1267
Note. Adapted From: Gelb, et al. (2013)

This section of the paper has shown a number of related things. First, food production has
barely kept up with population growth and that dramatic increases in food productivity have yet to
occur. Food prices in Sub-Saharan Africa have, over time, followed a different pattern when
compared to other regions of the world. Specifically, food prices have risen dramatically faster in
this region elative to much of the rest of the world. Unit labor costs in most Sub-Saharan African
countries are above those found in China and India. Even adjusting for the level of GDP per capita,
labor costs are higher in Sub-Saharan Africa. “Labor is relatively more costly in high-productivity
firms with relatively low levels of capital intensity, the most desirable kind of a firm in a poor
capital constrained country” (Gelb, et al., 2013, p.15). Finally, in many Sub-Saharan countries
production in formal sector firms is relatively capital intensive.
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Summary and Conclusions
It has been argued in this paper that Sub-Saharan Africa, while growing rapidly by
historical standards, is also experiencing deindustrialization. Structural change has not involved a
dramatic shift of labor from agriculture to manufacturing. Manufacturing has instead stagnated
and/or shrunk as a share of GDP and employment. This is important since manufacturing, once
established, experiences catch-up in terms of labor productivity and grows rapidly approaching
levels found in developed countries. Services, although having higher labor productivity in
agriculture, do not seem to be characterized by absolute convergence.
Conventional economics has argued that the inability of manufacturing to rapidly expand
is related to the poor business environment which exists in Sub-Saharan Africa. Efforts should be
made to reduce rules, regulations, and red tape which restrict manufacturing growth. In addition,
corruption also makes it very difficult to establish new firms. Efforts also need to be devoted to
expanding basic infrastructure.
While not denying that the above are possible important factors restricting the growth of
manufacturing, this paper, using a classical approach, focuses on a much more straight forward
explanation. Manufacturing firms (formal sector) in the region find that labor is relatively
expensive and as a result utilize more capital intensive technology and thus find it extremely
difficult to develop a comparative advantage in manufacturing. Labor is increasingly abundant in
the region due to population growth, but it is increasingly expensive due to the rapid rise in the
cost of food. In a semi-open economy the prices of food staples are endogenous. Rapid expansion
in modern manufacturing is restricted by the rising cost of food. Empirical evidence supporting
these propositions was presented for the region.
The key policy implication is very clear. Unless agricultural productivity can be rapidly
increased, stabilizing the price of food staples, labor will remain expensive even though it is
relatively abundant and modern, and labor intensive manufacturing growth will be limited. The
difficulty in raising agricultural productivity is not so much technical or scientific in nature.
Instead, the main difficulty is institutional in nature. The great diversity of staple food agriculture
in the region implies that the research and extension system necessary to create and adapt the
technology must be decentralized. However, funding such an institutional structure from within
the region will create significant problems. Research into particular crops will benefit specific
regions only. Regions dependent on a particular food staple are unlikely to support funding for
other food crops. Economies of scale from research are likely to be limited. Significant investment
at the regional level is likely to be required, most likely beyond the financial means of the region
involved. Creating the institutional structure necessary to generate the technical innovation in food
staple production will prove to be difficult. In the face of these institutional difficulties much of
the agricultural research that has been carried out in the past has focused on non-staple agricultural
commodities which have generally been exported. Research and development has been biased
against staple food production. Unless this bias is altered, it is highly unlikely that rapid growth in
manufacturing can occur.
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